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Governmental regulation of traffic in intoxicating liquor has long been a problem
in American constitutional law. By the middle of the last century the states had
begun to regulate, and sometimes prohibit, the transportation, sale and use of in-
toxicating liquor. At first these regulations were upheld by the Supreme Court even
though they applied to liquor being brought in from another state., In 189 o in the
case of Leisy v. Hardin,- however, the Court reversed its earlier position and held
that inasmuch as intoxicating liquor was a legitimate commodity of interstate com-
merce the commerce clause carried a negative implication to the effect that even
though Congress was silent on the matter a state could not prohibit the introduction
of liquor into the state nor its sale by the importer in the original package. Acting
in large part upon the Court's dictum that this impotency of the states could be
removed by Congressional action certain states immediately brought pressure to
bear on Congress for such legislation, and within a few months Congress passed the
Wilson Act.' This statute provided that all intoxicating liquors transported into any
state or territory for use, sale or storage should upon arrival therein be subject to the
laws of such state or territory, and should not be exempt therefrom by reason of being
introduced in original packages or otherwise.
The force and effectiveness of the Wilson Act was seriously lessened, some eight
years after its passage, when the Supreme Court held that the words "upon arrival"
meant delivery by the carrier to the consignee whose right to receive the shipment
was still protected by the Commerce Clause.4 As a result, dealers from outside the
state were able to solicit orders from individuals, and have the liquor shipped directly
to them. To prevent evasion of state prohibition laws by this "mail order" business
Congress passed, in 1913, the Webb-Kenyon Act.5 This Act declared that "the ship-
ment or transportation ... of intoxicating liquor ... intended ... to be received,
possessed, sold or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise in
violation of the laws of the state ... is hereby prohibited." It was held constitutional
in a five to four decision in 1917 in the case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md.
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Ry. Co.6 But judicial interpretation again intervened and narrowed the scope of the
Act. In Adams Express Co. v. Ky.7 the Supreme Court held that where a state
permits personal use of liquor it cannot forbid the importation of intoxicants for
personal use because the Act consented to regulation only where the liquor was to
be received, possessed, sold or used contrary to the law of the state. Presumably to
remedy this defect the Reed Amendment8 to the Act was added. Much more drastic,
it provided for federal punishment for persons importing liquor into a state for
personal use, even though the state merely prohibited the manufacture and sale of
such articles and permitted importation for personal consumption. Two years after
its passage the Court upheld the Reed Amendment in the case of U. S. V. Hill
Shortly thereafter came the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment, and for a
decade the Federal Government undertook the enforcement of Prohibition upon a
nationwide scale.
National Prohibition came to an end in 1933 with the adoption of the Twenty-
first Amendment, and liquor control and regulation was returned to the states. The
second clause of the Amendment reads:
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited."
The Congressional debates on Repeal indicate that this section was enacted in an
effort to guarantee to the states by the Constitution the same freedom to control
liquor that the Webb-Kenyon Act had given them by statute.' This was felt neces-
sary first, because the Webb-Kenyon Act had been sustained by a divided Court, and
there was always the possibility that the views of the minority might sometime gain
the ascendency, and second, because Congress itself might modify or repeal the
Webb-Kenyon Act and leave the "dry" states without protection.
Although the second section of the Amendment is substantially the same as the
Webb-Kenyon Act, the raising of this statute to the status of a Constitutional pro-
vision has narrowed federal power. So long as the provision was embodied in a
Congressional act Congress could determine whether liquor in interstate commerce
was a subject of national concern solely within the power of the Federal Government
or whether it was one of local interest and subject to prohibitions of the states in the
absence of Congressional action; but when made a part of the Constitution this
power of Congress to determine the status of liquor being transported or imported
into a state was taken away and it was fixed once and for all by the Amendment that
the state could prohibit the transportation or importation into the state in violation
of its laws.
From the history of the Amendment it appears that its purpose, like that of the
Webb-Kenyon Act, was to protect "dry" states." The language of the Amendment,
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however, is subject to a literal interpretation which is much broader, and the Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions written by Mr. Justice Brandeis, has taken this broader
view.
The first of this series was State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co32
The state of California had imposed a license fee of $5oo for the privilege of import-
ing out-of-state beers. The Young's Market Co. imported beer from Missouri and
Wisconsin and sold it at wholesale in California. They claimed that the requirement
of an importer's license was a violation of the commerce clause and a discrimination
contrary to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court,
while admitting that the statute would have been an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce prior to the Twenty-first Amendment, held that the words used
in the second clause were appropriate to give the state "the power to forbid all
importations which did not comply with the conditions which it prescribes."' 3
The plaintiff's contention that limitation of the broad language of the Amend-
ment is sanctioned by its history and by the decisions of the Court on the Wilson
Act, the Webb-Kenyon Act and the Reed Amendment was dismissed by the Court
with the observation: "As we think the language of the Amendment is clear, we do
not discuss these matters."'14 The plaintiff's claim that the statute was void under
the equal protection clause was disposed of by the Court by the statement: "A
classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed for-
bidden by the Fourteenth. '15 The Court then went on to point out that in fact there
was no discrimination because California brewers were subject to a fee of $75o on
another basis.
While there was little doubt but that the Young's Market case had removed the
check on state powers formerly contained in the commerce clause, it could be con-
tended that the decision did not have the same consequence with respect to the equal
protection clause because the Court had in fact found no discrimination and thus its
comments in regard to the equal protection clause were obiter dicta. The Court's
decision in Mahoney v. The Joseph Triner Corp.'0 took away the basis for this
contention. A Minnesota statute prohibited the importation of liquor where the
brands were not registered in the United States Patent Office. Identical liquors which
were so registered were admitted. The corporation contended that the statute violated
the equal protection clause. The Court held that since the adoption of the Twenty-
first Amendment the equal protection clause is not applicable to imported intoxicat-
ing liquor, and that discrimination either in favor of domestic over imported liquor,
or between various imported liquors is permissible even though it is not an incident
of reasonable regulation of the liquor traffic.
Two recent decisions, handed down on the same day, give added force to the
conclusion that the commerce clause and equal protection clause are no longer checks
upon state power. In the first of these cases, Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. The Liquor
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Control Commission of the State of Michigan,'7 an Indiana corporation manufactur-
ing beer in that state was prevented from selling its products in Michigan by a
Michigan statute prohibiting its dealers from selling any beer manufactured in a state
which discriminated against Michigan. Indiana was such a discriminating state.
The plantiff sought to enjoin enforcement of the statute, contending that the law
should be held void as a violation of the commerce clause, and the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; and asserted that the law
was "retaliatory" in punishing Indiana for doing what she was allowed to do under
the Young's Market decision, that is, to impose regulations and a fee upon importers.
The Court denied the injunction and held the statute to be valid, whether retaliatory
or not.
In the companion decision of Finch & Co. v. McKittrick's the Court completely
closed the door to any limitation by the commerce clause upon the right of the state
to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor. The state of Missouri
had enacted an "Anti-Discrimination Act" which prohibited the purchase, sale,
receipt or possession by any licensee of liquor manufactured in a "state in which
discrimination exists" against Missouri products and declared unlawful the transpor-
tation or importation of such liquor into Missouri. Four distillers and an importer,
whose products were denied admittance to the state of Missouri, attacked the validity
of the statute, urging that the law did not relate to the police powers of the state but
was clearly "an economic weapon of retaliation," and that in such an extreme
situation the Twenty-first Amendment should not be allowed to render inoperative
the power of the commerce clause. The Court said: ". . . since the Amendment the
right of the state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not
limited by the Commerce Clause.""'
It is in connection with, and in light of, this background of the Twenty-first
Amendment-its historical development, the intention of its framers, and the broad
interpretation given to it by the Supreme Court-that we should approach the prob-
lems which arise today in connection with liquor and the Constitution.
One such problem arises in connection with the transportation of liquor through
a state. Suppose a manufacturer in Kentucky wishes to ship liquor across Virginia
for delivery in Maryland. The question arises as to who has power to regulate the
shipment in transit across Virginia? Since such a shipment is obviously not for
"delivery or use" in Virginia and thus not within the purview of the Twenty-first
Amendment it would appear that the state would have no power to prohibit or
regulate such an interstate shipment. This was, in fact, the holding of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in such a case.20 On the other hand, the shipment is
clearly in interstate commerce and since the Twenty-first Amendment is inoperative
the Federal Government should have the same power over it as it possessed prior to
the Amendment.
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Closely akin to the problem of the power to regulate transportation through a
state is that of state and federal power over the exportation of intoxicants from a state.
The only case thus far to reach the Supreme Court touching upon this problem is
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves.2' In this case the plaintiff, an Indiana corporation, engaged
in transporting whisky from Kentucky to Illinois, sought to restrain enforcement of
a Kentucky statute requiring that all transporters of liquor be licensed, and that
licenses be granted only to common carriers. The plaintiff, a contract carrier, was
thus unable to obtain a license, and challenged the validity of the statute under the
commerce, due process and equal protection clauses.
The opinion of Mr. Justice McReynolds upholding the statute is not altogether
clear, but apparently the Court reasoned about as follows: The state has always had
power to regulate the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicants within the
state and to adopt appropriate measures to effectuate such inhibitions. Here Kentucky
seeks by its regulation to minimize the evils attending the liquor traffic and to enforce
its revenue measures. The licensing of transporters within the state is a reasonable
and appropriate means of accomplishing these ends, and although such licensing
will necessarily affect the exportation of liquor insofar as the transportation is within
the borders of Kentucky it is better to interfere with interstate commerce to this
limited degree than to render ineffective the whole regulatory system.
If instead of licensing all transportation within the state, Kentucky had imposed a
license fee or a tax upon exports alone it is almost certain that the Court would have
declared it invalid. In an early case the Court said that where liquor could be legally
manufactured within the state it was beyond the power of the state either to forbid
or impede its exportation. 22 In predicting future decisions one must distinguish,
therefore, between statutes that aim directly at the exportation of liquor, and those
which are directed toward the regulation of the liquor traffic within the state but
incidentally affect interstate commerce.
Although the Twenty-first Amendment was brought into the decision in the
Ziffrin case, it has, in fact, no application to the exportation of liquor from a state
because by its very language it is limited to transportation or importation into a state.
It would seem clear, therefore, that the respective powers of state and Federal Govern-
ment over such exports remain the same as before the Twenty-first Amendment.
A third problem is raised by shipments into a state which are not in violation
of any laws thereof, and which consequently do not fall within the prohibition of
the Twenty-first Amendment. In such a situation does federal power over interstate
shipments remain unimpaired? On the basis of the background of the Twenty-first
Amendment the answer would seem to be that since it restricts federal commerce
power only as to "transportation or importation into a state for delivery or use therein
in violation of the laws thereof," if the state has not legislated upon the subject of
liquor, federal power under the commerce clause remains as before the Amendment.
It has been suggested, however, that there exists here a negative implication com-
21 308 U. S. 132 (0939). "2Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. i (1888).
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parable to the negative implication of the commerce clause.23 To apply such a doc-
trine in the field of liquor control would mean that the power of the states in the
areas set forth in the Twenty-first Amendment negatives by implication the possibil-
ity of federal action even when the state is silent unless a foothold of national interest
is found.2 4 Such an analysis seems inconsistent either with the literal or historical
interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment. It disregards the fact that the
Twenty-first Amendment does not operate as an affirmative grant of power to the
states, but rather as a limitation upon federal power in that Congress cannot authorize
the "transportation or importation of liquor into a state for delivery or use therein
in violation of the laws of such state." When not subject to this restriction, federal
power over liquor in interstate commerce is in all respects the same as before the
Amendment.
In the case of Collins v. The Yosemite Park & Curry Co. 5 the problem of who
has the power to regulate liquor within a federal territory was first raised. California
had ceded to the United States the territory which is included in Yosemite National
Park, reserving the power to tax in this area. The Yosemite Park Company, engaged
in the sale of liquor in the Park, refused to obtain a California license or comply with
California regulations. The state contended that the Twenty-first Amendment gave
it the right to regulate the sale and use of alcoholic beverages within the Park. The
Supreme Court held that although the state had the power to tax, the federal power
of regulating intoxicating liquor in federal territory is not affected by the Twenty-first
Amendment. Such a conclusion seems inevitable in light of the background of the
Twenty-first Amendment.
It has already been pointed out that the Twenty-first Amendment is substantially
the same as the Webb-Kenyon Act. There is one principal difference in the wording
of the two. The Webb-Kenyon Act uses the phrase "shipment and transportation"
while the Twenty-first Amendment employs the words "transportation or importa-
tion." It is not certain what the framers intended by the term "importation." It may
have been that the words "transportation or importation" were used in order to deal
effectively both with the transporter, the one actually carrying the liquor across state
lines, and the importer, the person having the liquor brought from one state to
another. If, however, "importation" is taken in its more technical constitutional mean-
ing, conflicts may arise between state regulation and the power of the Federal Gov-
ernment to conduct foreign affairs and regulate foreign commerce. Suppose, for
example, that the Federal Government agrees by treaty with a foreign nation that
citizens of that country residing in the United States shall be permitted to import
liquor into this country. One of the states then passes a law forbidding the licensing
of aliens to import or sell liquor within the state. Obviously, to uphold the state
law would be to allow it to thwart the Federal Government in its sovereign power to
make agreements and treaties with foreign powers. It would, in reality, amount to
2' de Ganahl, The Scope of Federal Power Over Alcoholic Beverages since the Twenty-first Amend-
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a surrender of sovereignty in this field to the state. Should such a case arise the Court
might advert to any one of three possible approaches:
First, it might hold that under the Twenty-first Amendment the state has power
to prohibit the bringing of liquor into the state under whatever conditions it chooses
without regard to the effect of such prohibition upon the federal power over foreign
commerce and international relations.
Second, it might interpret the Twenty-first Amendment so as to preclude the
state from thwarting the Federal Government in the exercise of these sovereign
powers by limiting the application of the Amendment to interstate commerce.
Finally, the Court might follow its decision in the case of U. S. v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Co.,26 that the powers of the Federal Government in respect to foreign affairs
do not rest exclusively upon the Constitution but were derived directly from the
crown and inhere in the nation as a sovereign. It would be but a short step to hold
that this sovereign power had not been surrendered to the states by the Twenty-first
Amendment.
While there is good reason for believing that the Court, if faced with such a
situation, would take the second or third approach, the literal interpretation given
the Amendment in the series of decisions by Mr. Justice Brandeis suggests that the
first approach is not wholly out of the question.
To date the actual litigation in respect to matters of foreign commerce seem to
have arisen in connection with the enforcement of the Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act,27 under which the Federal Government has entered a broad field of liquor
control and regulation. The Act requires that each distiller, rectifier, wine manufac-
turer or importer secure a federal permit. Through the exercise of discretion in
granting, denying, suspending and revoking permits the federal administrative agency
can exclude undesirable elements from the industry and enforce the prohibitions of
other sections of the Act.
Section 5 relates to abuses and evils which were prevalent in the pre-Prohibition
era. Exclusive sales agreements, the "tied-house," commercial bribery and consign-
ment sales are all defined and made unlawful. It fixes the kinds of labels to be used
on the various types of liquors, and designates the matters which must appear on
the label to inform consumers as to the identity and quality of the contents. It pre-
cludes all liquor advertising unless it conforms to prescribed standards. Section 8
forbids interlocking directorates and similar practices which might result in a recur-
rance of the notorious "whiskey trust."
In light of the corruption, political interference and tax evasion of part of the
liquor industry before Prohibition, the regulations of the Act seem reasonable and
expedient. It has been contended, however, that the labeling provisions of the Act
are unconstitutional. In Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau28 the plaintiff was denied
entry of liquor from England which was not labeled according to federal require-
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ments. The importer brought injunction proceedings alleging that the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the states complete and exclusive control over commerce in in-
toxicating liquors and hence that Congress no longer has authority to control the
importation of these commodities into the United States. Here again is evidenced
the misconception that the Twenty-first Amendment is an affirmative grant to the
state of exclusive power over interstate commerce in liquor. We have already ob-
served that such an analysis is inconsistent with either a literal or a historical inter-
pretation of the Amendment. Congressional power over liquor is derived from its
constitutional authority to tax, regulate commerce, establish and operate a postal
system, and from its war and treaty powers. The sole effect of the Twenty-first
Amendment is to take away from Congress the power to authorize the transporta-
tion or importation of liquor into a state in violation of its laws. With this one
exception the power which Congress had over liquor before the Twenty-first Amend-
ment remains unimpaired. In the Jameson case there was no attempt on the part
of the Federal Government to authorize a shipment into a state in violation of its
laws. On the contrary, a shipment was being excluded before reaching state borders
and the power of the Federal Government in such an instance seems clear.
We have observed how the Supreme Court has upheld state barriers and dis-
criminations against out-of-state liquors. That such a policy of state protectionism in
respect to the liquor industry is injurious seems clear. It restricts production in areas
where it can be more advantageously carried on and fosters it in areas less favorably
situated, thus increasing costs to the consumer. It necessitates an elaborate adminis-
trative machinery in each state to enforce its provisions for exclusion and discrimina-
tion. It will probably lead to further trade barrier legislation of much more serious
consequence. It is likely that of all the problems raised by the adoption and broad
interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment, that of stemming the rising tide of
state barriers in the interstate liquor sphere is the most pressing.
Barring Constitutional Amendment or the reversal by the Court of its present
position three possible lines of remedial action are open:
First, although the possibility of direct Congressional intervention to halt the
abuse of state power seems to have been precluded by the Supreme Court's decisions
interpreting the Twenty-first Amendment, it would appear that Congress could in-
directly discourage the development of state barriers by such methods as the con-
ditional grant-in-aid, or by refusing federal cooperation to states which have
discriminatory laws and regulations.
Second, the Supreme Court, without being inconsistent with its present position
that a state can exclude out-of-state liquor introduced in violation of its laws, can
prevent a certain amount of discrimination by resort to the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions. Thus if State X permitted a distiller of another state to do business
within the state only upon condition that he forego his right to sue in a federal court,
such a provision could be invalidated as an unconstitutional condition.
Finally, of course, the states may, after cooperative investigation like that under-
taken by the Council of State Governments, adopt appropriate remedial measures
and follow a policy of self-restraint and cooperation.
